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LOW-INCOME FATHERS, ADOPTION, AND THE
BIOLOGY PLUS TEST FOR PATERNAL RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Jonathan Lehr and his girlfriend of two years, Lorraine, were
expecting a baby.1 Lorraine told her friends, relatives, and the
New York State Department of Social Services that Jonathan was
the father.2 When Lorraine gave birth, Jonathan visited her and
baby Jessica in the hospital every day.3 Then, after their release
from the hospital, Lorraine and Jessica disappeared.4 Jonathan
searched for his daughter, but each time he found them Lorraine
and Jessica moved again.5 When Jonathan found Jessica a year
later with the aid of a detective agency, Lorraine refused to let
him financially assist his daughter and threatened to have him
arrested if he attempted to see her.6 Jonathan hired a lawyer and
filed a paternity petition, only to learn that Lorraine and her new
husband had already instituted adoption proceedings.7
When Jonathan requested that the court await the results of
the paternity proceeding before ruling on Jessica’s adoption, he
discovered that, despite knowing of the pending paternity
proceeding, the judge had already signed an adoption order.8
Although he identified himself as Jessica’s father by instituting a
paternity proceeding, Jonathan failed to file with the state putative
father registry.9 Because of this fact, the United States Supreme
Court, applying the “biology plus” theory of paternal rights, held
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1. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983).
2. Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 252 (majority opinion).
8. Id. at 253.
9. Id. at 251.
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that Jonathan was not entitled to notice of Jessica’s adoption
proceedings, and Jonathan lost all rights to his daughter.10
While Lehr v. Robertson is now a decades-old case in an area
of law that changes rapidly, the case set a concerning foundation
for determining the parental rights of a man who fathers children
outside of marriage.11 In Lehr, the Court did not deny that an
unmarried father could have paternal rights. Constitutional
protection of their parental rights extends to all parents, regardless
of marital status.12 The Ninth Amendment and the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
protect these rights.13 Court-imposed responsibilities such as
child support payments extend to both married and unmarried
parents as well,14 and those who fail to meet these responsibilities
may be subject to civil or criminal penalties.15 These penalties
may range from monetary fines to incarceration to involuntary
termination of parental rights or, in the most extreme cases, a
finding that no parental relationship ever existed.16
While the percentage of children born to unmarried parents
has declined in recent years, well over one third of all children
born in the United States in 2015 were born out of wedlock.17
Statistics show that significantly more African-American and

10. Id. at 251-56, 261-65.
11. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275-76 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion
“represents a grudging and crabbed approach to due process” that does not serve state
interests, as it “may result in years of additional litigation and threaten the reopening of
adoption proceedings and the vacation of the adoption”).
12. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
13. Id. at 658; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965); see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (finding that a statute granting child
support to marital children while denying that support to nonmarital children violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
15. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 46-225.02 (2017) (instituting criminal penalties for failure
to pay child support); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:75 (2017) (punishing failure to pay child support
with fines and imprisonment); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 111.1 (2017) (treating failure to pay
child support as civil contempt of court).
16. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 46-225.02 (2017) (instituting criminal penalties for failure
to pay child support); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:75 (2017) (punishing failure to pay child support
with fines and imprisonment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-609 (2017) (“[T]he court may
terminate the parental rights of a putative father . . . [when] a judicial determination is
made . . . that the parent and child relationship does not exist.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 111.1
(2017) (treating failure to pay child support as civil contempt of court).
17. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2015, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Jan.
5, 2017, at 8, https:// www.cdc.gov /nchs /data /nvsr /nvsr66 /nvsr66 _01 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y66Z-3ZML].
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Hispanic men than non-Hispanic white men father their first child
in a non-marital relationship.18 Unmarried fathers, on average,
are younger, less educated, and more likely to be unemployed
than married fathers.19 Because of these factors, unmarried
fathers are more vulnerable to ignorance of their legal rights and
responsibilities and are less likely to have assistance of counsel in
custody hearings than their middle-class, married counterparts.20
This difference becomes particularly relevant in situations
such as Lehr’s, where the father knows of a child’s existence, but,
through no fault of his own, has no legally cognizable relationship
with that child. Had Lehr been educated about his responsibilities
and registered as a putative father (rather than filing a petition for
adoption), he might have obtained custody of his daughter.21
This Comment purposes to explore ways in which the
current “biology plus” test for determining existence of a paternal
relationship disproportionately affects lower-income minority
fathers who are unlikely to be fully aware of the legal hoops they
must jump through to establish paternity. Part II of this Comment
provides necessary background on both the history of fathers’
rights and current child-rearing in the United States. Part III lays
out the development of the biology plus test.22 Part IV examines,
18. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DATA BRIEF NO. 204, THREE DECADES OF NONMARITAL FIRST BIRTHS AMONG FATHERS
AGED 15-44 IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2015), http:// www. cdc.gov /nchs /data /databriefs
/db204.pdf [https://perma.cc/57SY-6ZQH]; see also GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW
RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE OF SINGLE FATHERS: A NINEFOLD INCREASE SINCE 1960, at 3
(2013), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/07/single-fathers-072013.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7VS-3PY2 ] (“[S]ingle fathers are typically less educated and
less well-off than their married counterparts. They are also younger and less likely to be
white.”).
19. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FATHERS
AND
MARRIAGE
2-3
(2007),
https://library.fatherhood.gov/cwig/
ws/library/docs/FATHERHD/Blob/59995.pdf?w=NATIVE%28%27TI+ph+is+%27%27N
RFC+Quick+Statistics%3A+Fathers+and+Marriage%27%27+AND+AUTHORS+ph+like
+%27%27National+Responsible+Fatherhood+Clearinghouse%27%27+AND+YEAR+%3
D+2007%27%29&amp;upp=0&amp;rpp=25&amp;order=native%28%27year%2FDescend
%27%29&amp;r=1&amp;m=1 [https://perma.cc/9PRF -BEAZ].
20. See, e.g., Theresa Amato, Opinion, Put Lawyers Where They’re Needed, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2015, at A25 (“Throughout the country, millions of low-income people have
no access to free or affordable lawyers, even for life-altering civil matters like child-custody
disputes . . . .”); Harry Reasoner, Finding New Ways to Give Access to Justice to Those Who
Cannot Afford Lawyers, 79 TEX. B.J. 366, 366 (2016) (“Texas legal aid organizations can
help only 10 percent of low-income Texans.”).
21. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983).
22. The biology plus test is one of the most widely-used tests for determining parental
rights. Other tests include a theory based solely on biological connection (now disfavored
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in some detail, three ways in which the biology plus test
disproportionately harms low-income fathers of color. Part V
discusses the implications of these issues and promotes continued
refinement of the biology plus test in order to alleviate its negative
effects.

II. BACKGROUND
As with all areas of law, the societal conception of paternal
rights has evolved throughout history as cultural values and
structures have shifted. This evolution continues in contemporary
society, due in part to rapid changes in the demographic of the
modern family.

A. Historical Background
Historically, fathers held significant rights over their
children. Ancient Roman fathers had unequivocal paternal rights
to custody of their children.23 Roman law utilized a proprietary
theory of paternal rights—in other words, it did not contemplate
the interests of the child in determining those rights, because it
considered children property.24 The law automatically assumed a
husband to be the father of his wife’s children, unless he “was
sterile, impotent, or had no access to his wife during the period
when conception occurred.”25 An unmarried man who fathered a
child with a married woman had no recognized right to that
child.26
and generally used only in surrogacy situations), a “constructionist” view based on an
implied contract between society and the parent, an “intention” theory, and the best interests
of the child test (used mainly in divorce or foster care cases). See, e.g., Dara E. Purvis,
Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210, 222-27
(2012). Because this Comment deals with the rights of often-unintentional biological fathers,
these other tests fall outside its scope. In addition, this Comment focuses solely on the
biology plus test’s impact on low-income unmarried fathers in adoption cases. Situations in
which a man seeks to rebut the marital presumption, as in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110 (1989), are outside the scope of this analysis.
23. Danaya C. Wright, De Manneville v. De Manneville: Rethinking the Birth of
Custody Law Under Patriarchy, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 247, 263 (1999) (stating that Roman
fathers had, arguably, “the most extreme example of parental rights existing in a civilized
and complex legal system. . . .”).
24. Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the
Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 223 (2002).
25. Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 47 (2003).
26. Id.
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The marital presumption, based in a desire for social stability
rather than genetic precision,27 extended throughout the Middle
Ages and embedded itself into English common law.28 A child
born outside of marriage belonged, legally, to no one,29 unless the
biological father chose to legitimize him.30 Neither the biological
mother nor the child could establish paternity on their own.31
Thus, for much of Western history, a putative father could legally
recognize, but had no legal obligation to, a nonmarital child.32
This allowed men to legitimize or ignore any nonmarital children
as they saw fit, with few, if any, repercussions.33 On the other
hand, it placed the onus of support for nonmarital children solely
on the mother.34
This state of affairs slowly began to change. In 1973, the
United States Supreme Court recognized a child’s right to receive
support from his or her father, regardless of the parents’ marital
status.35 Rather than filius nullius, a baby born out of wedlock
became a child of two parents, each of whom had responsibilities
toward that child.36
Additionally, a shift occurred in courts’ mindsets regarding
disputes over parental rights, beginning with the Maryland High
Court of Chancery’s 1830 decision Helms v. Franciscus.37 In
Helms, the court created an exception to the traditional
presumption of paternal custody after divorce, stating,
[Although] in general, no Court can take from [a father] the
custody and control of [his children] . . . even a Court of
common law will not go so far as to . . . snatch [an infant]

27. Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 24, at 222.
28. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446, *454-55.
29. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 253 (1995) (“An
illegitimate child was ‘filius nullius’—she had no legal relationship to anyone.”).
30. Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 24, at 223.
31. E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity
Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 10 (1992).
32. Id. (“[B]oth ancient and medieval civilizations protected the putative father to the
detriment of the mother and child by refusing to force the father to recognize his true
biological relationship to those children born out-of-wedlock.”).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See generally Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
36. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 253.
37. 2 Bland 519, 535-36 (Md. 1830).
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from the bosom of an affectionate mother, and place it in the
coarse hands of the father.38

This signaled the beginning of a movement toward greater
recognition of maternal rights and a corresponding decrease in a
father’s rights toward his child.39
It is worth noting that the tendency to award custody to
fathers extended only to those married to the child’s mother.40
Unmarried fathers experienced hostility and a general neglect of
their rights by both the judicial and legislative branches of
government.41 Many believed a putative father’s unmarried
status automatically made him unfit to care for a child, while
others assumed constitutional protections designed to safeguard
parental rights did not apply to a father not married to his child’s
mother.42
The United States Supreme Court extended constitutional
protection to the rights of unwed fathers in 1972.43 While the
Court continues to uphold these constitutional rights, it predicates
them on something more than merely a biological connection,44 a
theory commonly called the “biology plus” test45 and discussed
in detail in Part III of this Comment.46 However, the marital
presumption still applies by statute in many states,47 and has been
38. Id.
39. Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM.
L. 423, 435 (1976).
40. Amy S. Haney, Comment, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers in
Georgia: In re Baby Girl Eason, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 591 (1989) (“Prior to 1972 an
unwed father’s rights were virtually nonexistent.”).
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
43. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658 (rejecting as unconstitutional the state’s presumption that
unmarried fathers—but not unmarried mothers—were unfit parents).
44. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 637, 650-63 (1993); see generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). However,
unlike parental rights, parental obligations—most notably child support payments—may
develop based solely on biology. See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The
History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
1, 7-9 (2004).
45. Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise
His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 975 (1992).
46. See infra Part III.
47. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204 (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2017);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204 (2017); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 (2017); ME. STAT.
tit. 19, § 1881 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-17.2 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE §
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upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court, even when the
biological father has developed and maintained a relationship
with his child.48

B. Marriage and Child-Rearing Data
Understanding the rights of unmarried fathers is especially
important today in light of recent demographic trends involving
marriage.49 Currently, 20% of American adults over age 25 have
never been married,50 and those who do marry do so at older ages
than in previous decades.51 A groom’s average age at first
marriage increased from 23 in 1960 to 29 in 2012.52 Individuals
without post-secondary education marry, on average, earlier than
individuals with a college degree or higher.53 However, men with
no post-secondary education are less likely than their counterparts
with post-graduate degrees to marry at all.54 As a general rule,
people with higher levels of education are more likely to get
married and to stay married.55
However, the lack of a marriage license does not mean an
individual is necessarily “single.”56 Almost a quarter of

26.26.116 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. § 891.41 (West 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504
(West 2017).
48. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128-30 (1989) (upholding denial of
paternal rights under state statute to biological father when the “mother is, at the time of the
child’s conception and birth, married to, and cohabitating with, another man, both of whom
wish to raise the child as the offspring of their union”).
49. See generally KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., RECORD SHARE OF
AMERICANS HAVE NEVER MARRIED AS VALUES, ECONOMICS, AND GENDER PATTERNS
CHANGE (2014).
50. Id. at 4.
51. CASEY E. COPEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L
HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 49, FIRST MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE
2006-2010
NATIONAL
SURVEY
OF
FAMILY
GROWTH
1
(2012),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQM9-3TKZ].
52. PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 4-5. Over the same time period, women’s
average ages at first marriage increased from 20 to 27. Id.
53. Wendy Wang, The Link Between a College Education and a Lasting Marriage,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 4, 2015), http:// www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/ 2015/ 12/
04/education-and-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/6AR7-YZX8].
54. PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 9.
55. Alison Aughinbaugh et al., Marriage and Divorce: Patterns by Gender, Race, and
Educational Attainment, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2013, at 12-14, https:// www.bls.gov/
opub/ mlr/ 2013/ article/ pdf/ marriage-and-divorce-patterns-by-gender-race-andeducational-attainment.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD2G-QNEC].
56. See PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 16.
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unmarried young adults cohabitate.57 Those with no college
education are more likely to cohabitate, and their cohabitations
are less likely to result in marriage.58 Multiple factors contribute
to this decline in marriage rates, including economic pressures,59
changing social values,60 and a growing societal acceptance of
non-marital cohabitation.61
Individuals who have non-marital children are less likely to
marry early, and their marriages are less likely to last.62 As the
marriage rate declines, the number of non-marital children born
each year tends, unsurprisingly, to increase.63 Around 40% of
children—or 1.6 million babies64—born every year in the United
States are born outside of marriage.65 While this represents a
decrease in the non-marital birth rate since 2009,66 it is still high
compared to the 28% recorded in 1990.67 Seventy percent of
African-American, 66% of Native American, and 53% of
Hispanic mothers bore their children outside of wedlock in 2015,
compared to 29.2% of non-Hispanic white and 16% of Asian or
Pacific Islander mothers.68
Correspondingly, married fathers are more likely to be white
than single fathers.69 According to a 2015 study conducted by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), from 2000 to
57. Id.
58. See CASEY E. COPEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L
HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 64, FIRST PREMARITAL COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
2006-2010
NATIONAL
SURVEY
OF
FAMILY
GROWTH
3,
5
(2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL9A-UVLQ]. One of
the most common reasons for cohabitation instead of marriage is lack of financial
preparedness. PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 19.
59. PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 7.
60. JILL DAUGHERTY & CASEY COPEN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 92, TRENDS IN ATTITUDES ABOUT MARRIAGE,
CHILDBEARING, AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: UNITED STATES, 2002, 2006-2010, AND 20112013, at 3-5 (2016), https:// www.cdc.gov/ nchs/ data/ nhsr/ nhsr092.pdf
[https://perma.cc/25WN-5BEK]; see also LIVINGSTON, supra note 18, at 3.
61. DAUGHERTY & COPEN, supra note 60, at 4.
62. COPEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 6-8.
63. Marriage in America: The Fraying Knot, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21569433-americas-marriage-rate-fall ingand-its-out-wedlock-birth-rate-soaring-fraying [http://perma.cc/3T3K-Q3RN].
64. Martin et al., supra note 17, at 46.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id.
67. GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR. THE NEW
DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN MOTHERHOOD 1 (2010).
68. Martin et al., supra note 17, at 46.
69. LIVINGSTON, supra note 18, at 2.
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2009 36% of men fathered their first child outside of marriage.70
While 39% of out-of-wedlock first children during this time had
non-Hispanic white fathers, these men also made up an
overwhelming majority of the population at the time.71 Thus, the
number of non-marital first births to white fathers, while a high
percentage of the total number of births, is statistically far lower
than the prevalence of white men in the population at large would
indicate.72 Conversely, 33% of non-marital first births occurred
to Hispanic fathers, and 21% to African-American fathers,73
despite these ethnic groups constituting 16% and 12% of the
population, respectively.74 Sixty-six percent of African-American
fathers had a non-marital first birth, compared to 54% of Hispanic
fathers and 24% of non-Hispanic white fathers.75 Thus, compared
to the population at large, unmarried fathers are far more likely to
be men of color.76
Women with lower levels of education are more likely to
become pregnant early in a cohabitating relationship than those
with a college education.77 Thus, women without college degrees
are more likely to have nonmarital children than those with
college degrees.78 While there are few statistical studies on the
education levels of putative fathers, men tend to marry women of
similar educational attainment.79 As less-educated individuals are
less likely to transition from cohabitation to marriage, they are
more likely to give birth to non-marital children.80 Because
education levels and marital status correlate with income, these
individuals are more likely to fall into lower income strata.81

70. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., supra note 18, at 1.
71. Id. at 4. 72% of the American population identified as non-Hispanic white in the
2010 census. KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 (2011), https:// www.census.gov/ content/ dam/ Census/
library/ publications/2011/dec/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY9N-EPVF].
72. See id.
73. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., supra note 18, at 4.
74. HUMES ET AL., supra note 71, at 4.
75. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., supra note 18, at 2.
76. See id.
77. COPEN ET AL., supra note 58, at 6.
78. See id.
79. Richard V. Reeves, Opinion, Sex, Race, Education and the Marriage Gap,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/sex-race-education-and-mar riagegap-322591 [https://perma.cc/95MA-R9RB].
80. Id.; see also COPEN ET AL., supra note 58, at 6.
81. Aughinbaugh et al., supra note 55, at 3.
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Significantly, studies have shown that marital status and a
high income level often perpetuate one another,82 meaning that
marriage can often be an indicator of economic prosperity.83 This
is partially because the highly-educated are more likely to marry,
and generally marry each other, resulting in two individuals with
above-average earning capacity consolidating their economic
gains into one household.84 Because college graduates are
overwhelmingly white,85 and because Americans tend to marry
within their own ethnicities,86 this forces unmarried parents of
color to the lower levels of the economic strata.87

III. THE BIOLOGY PLUS TEST
The biology plus test, one of the most common standards for
parental rights in the American legal system, requires that an
unmarried father demonstrate his paternity through some
affirmative indicator outside of a biological relationship.88 In
other words, an unmarried biological father must take on the
“responsibilities of parenthood” before he receives parental
rights.89 He may do so by marrying the biological mother,
financially supporting the child, developing an emotional bond
with the child, or otherwise “acting like a husband, as well as like
a father.”90
Generally, the biology plus test relies on statutory
obligations, rather than subjective opinions, in determining
whether a putative father has established a relationship with his
biological child. State statutes, often based on the Uniform
Parentage Act,91 list specific ways in which a man may establish
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
See id.
Reeves, supra note 79.
THOMAS SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2016-014,
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2015, at 635 tbl.322.20 (2016).
86. See WENDY WANG ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE OF INTERMARRIAGE
5 (2012), http:// assets.pewresearch.org/ wp-content/ uploads/ sites/ 3/ 2012/02/SDTIntermarriage-II.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YPW-5429].
87. Reeves, supra note 79.
88. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 404-05 (2012).
89. Id. at 404; see also Dolgin, supra note 44, at 671 (stating that fatherhood depends
on social relationships with the child and the mother as well as biology).
90. Murray, supra note 88, at 405.
91. Portions of the Uniform Parentage Act have been adopted by multiple states.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002), http:// www.

2018

LOW-INCOME FATHERS, ADOPTION

1123

paternity.92
These include marriage to the mother,93
acknowledgment of the child as his own,94 adoption,95
adjudication of paternity,96 and, where available, filing with the
state putative father registry.97
A jurisdiction relying on the biology plus test supposedly
acts in an objective manner, as, when a putative father contests an
adoption proceeding, attempting to assert his rights to a child, the
court can simply look at the applicable statute and determine
whether the father has fulfilled the necessary obligations.98 If the
father has had no contact with the child, provided no financial
support, and did not enter his name in the putative father registry,
the court will most likely conclude that he has no paternal
relationship with that child.99 Thus, the court can safely terminate
his parental rights and allow the child’s adoption.

A. Judicial Development
The Supreme Court’s development of the biology plus test
began in 1972, when the Court decided Stanley v. Illinois.100 The
plaintiff, Peter Stanley, lost custody of his two minor children
under a state law that placed nonmarital children in state custody
at their mother’s death.101 The law required a finding of parental
unfitness before terminating the rights of married fathers or
uniformlaws.org/ shared/ docs/ parentage/ upa_ final_ 2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JSZTZZN]; see also, e.g., Uniform Parentage Act, TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 160.001 to 160.763
(West 2017); Uniform Parentage Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.011 to 26.26-914 (2017).
92. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
93. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(4)(a) (2017).
94. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-120 (2015); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-302
(2017) (authorizing unmarried fathers to voluntarily complete forms acknowledging
paternity of their newborns).
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-22(a)(2)(A) (2017).
96. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-172a (2017).
97. FLA. STAT. § 63.054 (2017).
98. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
99. See generally, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
100. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
101. Id. at 646. While Peter and Joan Stanley lived together off and on for eighteen
years, they were not married at the time of Joan’s death. Id. The statutes in question included
as parents only “the father and mother of a legitimate child . . . the natural mother of an
illegitimate child, and . . . any adoptive parent.” In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill.
1970), rev’d sub nom. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
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unmarried mothers, but not those of unmarried fathers.102 Peter
Stanley challenged the custody declaration on the grounds that
termination of his parental rights without determination of his
parental fitness violated the Equal Protection Clause.103
The Supreme Court held that refusing parental rights to a
father based solely on his marital status violated both the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.104 Rather, the Court stated that, by caring for his
children, and thus fulfilling the traditional role of a father for
eighteen years, Peter had established a paternal relationship
subject to constitutional protections.105 Because the state court
terminated Peter Stanley’s rights based solely on his marital
status, despite his active role in his children’s lives, the Supreme
Court found its ruling unconstitutional.106
Six years later, in Quilloin v. Walcott, the Supreme Court
again took up a case regarding an unmarried father’s parental
rights.107 Leon Quilloin, who had fathered a child with Ardell
Walcott eleven years prior, sought to prevent Ardell’s new
husband, Randall, from adopting that child.108 Although state law
at the time required the consent of both biological parents to the
adoption of a marital child, only the mother had to consent to the
adoption of a nonmarital child unless the father legitimized that
child.109 The Court found that Leon had no constitutionallyprotected parental interest.110
In Quilloin, as in Stanley, the Court based its reasoning on
the father’s conduct toward the child. It reasoned that a father
does not automatically have a right to his biological child merely
because that child exists, but must actively seek to establish a
relationship in order to obtain paternal rights.111 Because Leon
Quilloin never had nor sought custody of his child, never
102. In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d at 815, rev’d sub nom. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
103. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
104. Id. at 657-58 (“[The state] insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s
unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due
Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the
issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.”).
105. Id. at 646, 654-56, 658.
106. Id.; see also Dolgin, supra note 44, at 650-51.
107. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
108. Id. at 247.
109. Id. at 248-49.
110. Id. at 247, 252-53.
111. Id. at 255.
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legitimized the child (despite having eleven years to do so), and
received full notice and a hearing prior to the adoption, the Court
held that he had failed to establish the requisite paternal
relationship.112 In other words, though Leon had developed some
relationship with his child, it was not a significant enough
relationship to satisfy the Court.113
The Supreme Court took up the issue of unmarried fathers’
rights again the next year.114 The plaintiff in Caban v.
Mohammed, Abdiel Caban, sought to prevent the stepparent
adoption of his two biological children.115 Abdiel and the
children’s mother, Maria Mohammed, lived together for five
years, during which both parents contributed to the children’s
financial support.116 Maria then married another man, but Abdiel
continued to see his children weekly.117 Eventually, both Maria
and Abdiel, along with their new spouses, petitioned for
adoption.118 Following a state statute, which required only the
consent of the mother to adoption of a nonmarital child,119 a New
York Surrogate granted Maria’s petition and terminated Abdiel’s
parental rights.120
The Court echoed its decision in Stanley by declaring the
state law unconstitutional on the grounds that it “treat[ed]
unmarried parents differently according to their sex.”121 Writing
for the majority, Justice Powell stated that, while Abdiel’s new
wife could not adopt his children without Maria’s consent, Abdiel
could only block Maria’s husband from adopting his children if
he proved such an adoption was not in the children’s best
interest.122

112. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56.
113. Id.
114. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
115. Id. at 381-82.
116. Id. at 382.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 383.
119. The law in question, Section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Code,
stated: “[C]onsent to adoption shall be required as follows: . . . (b) Of the parents or surviving
parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the mother, whether
adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock. . . .” Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
120. Id. at 383-84.
121. Id. at 388.
122. Id. at 388.
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As part of the children’s best interest, the Court looked at the
relationship between Abdiel and his children.123 Applying the
biology plus test, it found that Abdiel had clearly established a
parental relationship with his children because his name appeared
on their birth certificates as their father, and because he had
provided financial support to, and lived with, the children as their
father for five years.124
Having established a parental
relationship, Abdiel obtained the corresponding rights.125 Thus,
based on Abdiel’s actions, rather than the biological connection
between him and his children, the Supreme Court found he had a
constitutional interest in continuing his paternal relationship.126
The Court reversed the grant of Maria’s adoption petition.127
Four years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lehr v.
Robertson reaffirmed that, in the Court’s mind, a father’s rights
are not predicated solely on biology.128 While Jonathan Lehr
attempted to locate his daughter, provided emotional support to
her mother, Lorraine, throughout the pregnancy, and offered
financial support that Lorraine rejected,129 the Court held that
these actions alone did not establish a parental relationship.130
Rather, the Court stated that Jonathan “never established a
substantial relationship with his daughter” because he failed to
marry Lorraine or live with Baby Jessica—two traditional,
conduct-based markers of paternity.131 In addition, the Court for
the first time considered the role of putative father registries,
stating that, despite Jonathan’s failure to file with the New York
registry, the very existence of the registry provided adequate
protection to his rights.132
123. Id. at 389.
124. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382, 389.
125. Id. at 389-93.
126. Id. at 394 (“The effect of New York’s classification is to discriminate against
unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant
paternal interest in the child. The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying
unwed fathers as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a
concerned judgment as to the fate of their children. Section 111 both excludes some loving
fathers from full participation in the decision whether their children will be adopted and, at
the same time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of
fathers.”).
127. Id.
128. See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
129. See id. at 269-70 (White, J. dissenting).
130. Id. at 251-56.
131. Id. at 251-52, 267.
132. Id. at 250-55, 263-64.
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B. States’ Responses
Following the Court’s decision in Stanley, in 1973 the
Uniform Law Commission drafted the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA).133 The UPA, designed to recognize unmarried fathers’
rights and stop differentiation between marital and nonmarital
fathers, integrated the biology plus test as a key tenet.134
Specifically, the UPA focused on paternal acknowledgement,
stating that a man who lives with his child and “openly holds out
the child as his natural child” has established a paternal
relationship with that child.135
Often looking to the UPA for guidance, states began
adopting the biology plus test through legislation.136 State
statutes generally require an unmarried biological mother’s
consent to the adoption of her child, but only require the
biological father’s consent if he meets certain guidelines.137
Significantly, these statutes often ignore the father’s subjective
intent toward the child in favor of how that intent manifests
through the father’s conduct.138 Such manifestations include
financial support, visitation, official acknowledgement of
paternity, or a significant relationship with the child’s mother.139
Enrollment in a putative father registry is one common
method of ensuring a father meets the statutory requirements of
the biology plus test. Such registries are encouraged in the

133. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1195 (2016).
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973)).
136. See, e.g., Kevin T. Lytle, Note, Rock-a-bye Baby: When Determining How and
Where the Cradle Should Fall, Nebraska “Blows It”—An Examination of Unwed Fathers’
Rights Regarding Their Children and Nebraska’s Infringement of Those Rights, 74 NEB. L.
REV. 180, 205 (1995) (“Scared into action by the implications of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Stanley, in September of 1974, a committee of attorneys and adoption
agency representatives began work on a legislative bill that would revise the Nebraska
adoption statutes. At the time of the Stanley decision, the Nebraska adoption statutes
provided no rights for an unwed father.”).
137. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 63.062(2) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(b) (2017); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4)‒(5) (2017).
138. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4) (2017) (“The subjective intent of the
father . . . does not preclude a determination that the father failed to maintain substantial and
continuous or repeated contact with the child.”).
139. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 63.062(2) (2017); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4)-(5) (2017).
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UPA140 and currently exist in at least half of the states.141 A man
may proactively file with a putative father registry regarding any
woman with whom he has had a physical relationship, whether or
not he knows she is pregnant.142 If he does so, he is then entitled
to receive notice of any proceedings within that state that may
jeopardize his paternal rights.143 Putative father registries offer a
way around unilateral deception by the mother and also serve to
provide courts with a means to reach the father in the event of an
adoption proceeding.144 For these reasons, putative father
registries are an excellent resource for unmarried fathers who,
through no fault of their own, have not been able to establish a
relationship with their child or otherwise fulfill statutory
requirements.

IV. THREE CRITIQUES OF THE BIOLOGY PLUS
CONDUCT TEST
In theory, the biology plus test is an effective way of
determining paternal rights. Not only does it provide a clear
standard for courts in determining when they may legally
terminate paternal rights, but it promotes faster adoption of young
children who might otherwise spend months, or years, in parental
limbo.145 If the biological father is not in the child’s life and has
not filed with a putative father registry, the court may more easily
terminate his parental rights and enter an adoption decree.146 This
not only provides the children in question with stability, but

140. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 401-02 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
141. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-36,201(a)(7)
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 48.025 (2017); CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, THE RIGHTS OF
UNMARRIED FATHERS 2 (2014), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BF6W-EEM H].
142. See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1039 (2002).
143. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 141, at 2.
144. Most putative father registries require at least the father’s name and current
address. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10C-1 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-702 (2014);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-172a (2017).
145. See Diane S. Kaplan, The Baby Richard Amendments and the Law of Unintended
Consequences, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Winter 2002, at 2-12.
146. See id.
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promotes judicial efficiency. However, theory is often much
different than practice, and such is sometimes the case in this area.
The biology plus test is not perfect. It can, in fact, lead to
arguably unjust results. The test emphasizes judicial efficiency
over paternal rights.147 Judicial efficiency is certainly important,
especially in cases regarding the guardianship and living
arrangements of young, impressionable children. Parental rights,
however, are protected by the Constitution and should not be
sacrificed in the name of efficiency.148 This Comment will
address three particular problems with the biology plus test as
applied to low-income, unmarried fathers: lack of notice, reliance
on putative father registries, and lack of uniformity between the
various states.149

A. Lack of Notice
One criticism of the biology plus test is the lack of notice it
provides unmarried fathers regarding their rights and
responsibilities. While it is certainly true that “ignorance of the
law is no excuse,”150 it is also true that parenthood is a
fundamental constitutional right.151 In contrast to adoptive
parents, the majority of whom are well above the poverty level,152

147. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 4, cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (advocating
the biology plus test as a means of promoting faster adoptions).
148. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
149. A detailed analysis of the constitutional issues raised by the biology plus test’s
application to low-income fathers of color is outside the scope of this Comment. It is worth
noting, however, that such issues do exist. Because parental rights are protected by the
Constitution, any government action that curtails these rights potentially raises constitutional
issues. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”). This particular
application of the biology plus test raises Equal Protection and Due Process Clause issues.
(While the Supreme Court has rejected claims that the biology plus theory violates the Equal
Protection Clause based on gender, despite its overt differentiation on the basis of sex, the
fact that the test’s application disadvantages men of color raises race-based Equal Protection
issues. See generally, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).).
150. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 4 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
151. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923).
152. JO JONES, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF
WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18-44 YEARS OF
AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 11-12, 23 (2008), https:// www. cdc.gov/ nchs/ data/
series/sr_23 /sr23_027.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6BC-4GX8].
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a majority of unmarried fathers are low-income.153 Since income
level correlates with education, these men are less likely to know
where to find information about their legal responsibilities—if,
indeed, they realize they have such responsibilities at all.154 Lowincome putative fathers are also unlikely to possess resources
necessary to engage legal representation or conduct an exhaustive
investigation of their rights.155

B. Putative Father Registries
Putative father registries are state-established databases that
allow a man who has had a physical relationship with a woman to
place his name on file as a potential father of any children that
woman may bear. The registries may serve to alleviate some of
the weaknesses in the biology plus test. There are, however,
significant weaknesses in the registries themselves. First, the
registries are only effective if fathers file with them and,
unfortunately, many unmarried men simply do not know the
registries exist. For instance, between 1989 and 2016, Arkansas’
registry recorded only 2,110 filings.156 In 2004, only forty-seven
putative fathers registered in Florida, while 90,000 non-marital
children were born in the state that same year.157 Virginia’s
registry, established in 2007, had sixty-four filings in its first year
compared with 38,000 out-of-wedlock births statewide.158
Because most unmarried fathers come from lower
socioeconomic strata, it stands to reason that the majority of those
153. In a Princeton and Columbia University study of 3,700 unmarried parents of
children born between 1998 and 2000, only 21.5 % of the fathers earned more than $25,000
per year. Marcia Carlson et al., Unmarried but Not Absent: Fathers’ Involvement with
Children After a Nonmarital Birth 30 tbl.1 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working
Paper No. 05-07-FF, 2005).
154. Employment Projections: Unemployment Rates and Earnings by Educational
Attainment, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Oct. 24, 2017), https: //www. bls.gov/ emp/ ep_
table_ 001.htm [https://perma.cc/N6EF-E3TD].
155. Amato, supra note 20.
156. Ellen Thalls, State Registry Could Protect Unmarried Fathers’ Rights, 5NEWS
ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2016, 8:06 PM), http://5newsonline.com/2016/01/28/state-registry-couldprotect-unmarried-fathers-rights-2/ [https://perma.cc/MB75-SCR2]. This number includes
“duplicate forms and children who are now over 18.” Id.
157. Timothy L. Arcaro, No More Secret Adoptions: Providing Unwed Biological
Fathers with Actual Notice of the Florida Putative Father Registry, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 449,
453 (2008).
158. Ashley Hottle, Virginia’s Putative Father Registry: Three Years Later, FAM. L.
NEWS (Va. State Bar Family Law Section, Richmond, Va.), Winter 2010, at 8-9,
http://www.vsb.org/docs/sections/family/winter2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZMG -H44X].
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who fail to file with the registries are also low-income. While
some registries, such as Florida’s and South Carolina’s, can be
located with a simple internet search and have online
registration,159 others are difficult to locate and complicated to file
with. Kansas has no information on its putative father registry on
its official government websites. Rather, a father must locate the
applicable section in the Department for Children and Families’
600-page Policy and Procedure manual, informing him that he
must call the Office of Child Support Services, who will then take
the ambiguous action of “direct[ing]” him to add his name to the
registry.160
This less-than-accessible state of affairs is likely one reason
that, in the twenty-five years between 1994 and 2016, only five
men filed with the Kansas registry.161 The combination of
ignorance of the registries’ existence and lack of resources to
investigate, which are both common to most low-income fathers,
makes it likely that such fathers comprise the majority of the men
who have failed to file with the registries.162
The drafters of the UPA originally recognized that the
outcomes dictated by a registry can be less than ideal, stating that
the registries work only in intrastate situations, are based on
“unsupported claims,” could be used by an unscrupulous potential
father to extort the child’s mother, and “provide a simple (albeit
‘hard-nosed’ and potentially unjust) solution when a father fails
to register . . . .”163 However, in 2002, the drafters changed their
position and “accept[ed] the importance and utility of a parentage
159. Putative Father Registry, FLA. HEALTH, http://www.floridahealth.gov/
certificates/certificates/birth/Putative_Father/index.html [https://perma.cc/98LP-C2 YL]
(last visited Sept. 8, 2017); S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Responsible Father Registry, SC.GOV,
https://ssl.sc.gov/DSSFatherRegistry/FatherReg/RegIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/L9NG5DKL] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
160. KAN. DEP’T FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, PREVENTION & PROT. SERVS., POLICY
AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 457 (Jan. 2018), http://www.dcf.ks.gov/services/PPS/
Documents/PPM_Forms/Policy_and_Procedure_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH 9 5UYX] (“To add a father to the registry, please contact Child Services Support [sic] and they
will direct you.”).
161. Amanda Palumbo & Angie Ricono, Independence Father Denied Custody After
Loophole Adoption, KCTV NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016, 10:14 PM), http:// www.kctv5. com/ story/
31050293/ independence- father- denied- custody- after- loophole- adoption
[https://perma.cc/L2CH-BCFE].
162. In contrast, adoptive parents are more likely to know their rights and how to
protect them, as they are better able to hire legal counsel. Supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
163. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 4 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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registry.”164 This change of heart stemmed not from a goal of
preserving fathers’ rights, but one of providing faster and easier
adoptions.165 Specifically, the UPA’s drafters asserted a goal of
providing quick and efficient adoption proceedings in cases
involving infants younger than one year.166
Because of their reduced access to legal resources and lower
levels of education, low-income unmarried fathers are more likely
to fall prey to the problems inherent in the biology plus test,
including the putative father registries.167 Thus, while it’s
efficient nature makes it appealing to courts and potential
adoptive parents, the biology plus test fails to preserve the rights
of the most vulnerable members of one of the populations it
should protect.
The putative father registries are a prime example of
promoting efficiency at the expense of paternal rights. They
allow courts to terminate paternal rights in situations where the
biological father has both the means and a desire to parent his
child.168 Such actions disproportionately affect low-income
fathers—and, by inference, fathers of color—at the enrichment of
middle- and upper-class white families.169

C. Lack of Uniformity Between States
Variations from state to state in the biology plus test’s
requirements constitute a third weakness in the test. Because
many states require strict compliance with their own statutes and
do not give credit to actions that fathers have taken to protect their
rights in other states, these variations can lead to undesirable
situations. This is particularly true when it comes to the state
putative father registries.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 150-66 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Manzanares v. Byington (In
re Adoption of Baby B.), 308 P.3d 382 (Utah 2012). O’Dea v. Olea, 217 P.3d 704 (Utah
2009).
169. While minority populations are disproportionately represented in the unmarried
father demographic, adoptive families are more likely than the general population to be
white. See SHARON VANDIVERE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADOPTION USA: A CHARTBOOK BASED ON THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE
PARENTS 13 (2009). Thus, a test that prioritizes the interests of adoptive families over the
interests of the biological father disproportionately disfavors minorities.
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While low-income fathers are unlikely to realize the
registries exist in the first place, those who do register in one state
are likely to believe that doing so protects their rights in all states.
However, because the registries are run by individual states, each
with its own set of rules and deadlines, that initial registry only
protects his rights within that initial state.170 If Jack registers in
State A as a putative father for Jill’s child, Jill merely has to move
to State B and put the child up for adoption there in order to
prevent Jack from receiving notice. Thus, even if a man enrolls
his name in his state’s putative father registry, there is no
guarantee that his rights will be protected.
Such a situation took place in Manzanares v. Byington (In re
Adoption of Baby B.),171 when Robert Manzanares’ ex-girlfriend,
Carie Terry, left their home state of Colorado under false
pretenses and gave birth to their daughter in Utah.172 Despite
knowing that Robert wished to keep the child, and without
informing him of her birth, Ms. Terry “executed a consent to
adoption in Utah” relinquishing Baby B. to her brother and sisterin-law.173 Even though Robert had complied with Colorado
requirements, filed a paternity petition in Colorado, and
consistently opposed putting his daughter up for adoption while
expressing his desire to parent her, the Utah court still terminated
his parental rights.174 After an extensive legal battle lasting
several years, Robert finally gained partial custody rights to his
daughter, but the adoptive parents maintained physical
custody.175 It is worth noting that Robert’s fight for his parental
170. See, e.g., infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
171. 308 P.3d 382 (Utah 2012).
172. Id. at 386-87. Utah’s adoption laws did not require consent from an unmarried
biological father who had not complied with strict statutory requirements unless he did not
know the mother resided in Utah and fulfilled paternity requirements in the mother’s
previous state of residence or the state of conception before the mother consented to
adoption. See id. at 389-90.
173. Id. at 387.
174. See id. at 386-87.
175. Brooke Adams, Father Wins Role in Life of Daughter Being Raised by Utah
Couple, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2014, 9:53 PM), http://archive.
sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/57648198-78/manzanares-utah-judge-case.html .csp
[https://perma.cc/WC73-CHYJ]. In a small victory for Robert Manzanares, the Colorado
judge who issued the ruling at least denied the adoptive parents—the Byingtons—requested
child support. Id. Utah has since passed a law requiring birth mothers who have not lived
in the state at least ninety days to “file with the court, a declaration regarding each potential
birth father” and to “search the putative father registry” of states where she conceived the
baby or lived while pregnant. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-110.5(1) (West 2017). The mother
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rights cost nearly $250,000—an amount far beyond the reach of
most unmarried fathers.176
In addition, the lack of uniformity between states means that
the biology plus test’s requirements are not as objective as they
may at first appear. The interstate statutory variations and
nebulous obligations in those statutes—such as “fair and
reasonable” financial support177 or a “significant . . .
relationship . . . with the [child]”178—leave room for broad
judicial interpretation. This is especially significant because
adoptive households are more likely to be conventional, twoparent households, which are traditionally considered more
stable.179 In addition, the expense associated with adoption
procedures results in most adoptive families placing well above
the poverty line.180 Because children raised in higher-income
households receive both tangible and intangible benefits a lowerincome family cannot provide, judges will often (consciously or
unconsciously) favor more wealthy parties in a parental rights
determination case.181 This, coupled with a shortage of newborns
available for adoption,182 could potentially lead to wealthier
individuals using the judicial system to strong-arm poor fathers
into handing over their children.183

V. MOVING AHEAD

must then inform an interested or unaware putative father that she plans to put the child up
for adoption in Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-110.5(3) (West 2017).
176. Robert Manzanares, Illegal Adoption of Kaia: Donations to Legal Fund,
http://illegaladoption.com/donations-to-legal-fund/ [https://perma.cc/E3U5-CF9D] (last
visited Sept. 8, 2017).
177. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4) (2017).
178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206(a)(2)(F) (2015).
179. VANDIVERE, ET AL., supra note 169, at 17.
180. Id. at 9, 15. One adoption agency estimates the 2015-16 cost of a private, agencyassisted domestic newborn adoption at between $34,000 and $38,000. How Much Does It
Cost to Adopt a Child?, AM. ADOPTIONS, http://www.american adoptions.com/ adopt/ why_
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Although the biology plus test has its weaknesses, it remains
a viable test because it allows judicial efficiency while still
providing some measure of protection to unmarried fathers’
rights. Until legislators or the Supreme Court develop a better test,
lawmakers should continue to refine the existing test. A number
of minor changes would alleviate some of the harms while still
maintaining the benefits of the test.

A. Uniformity
Ideally, the test’s requirements should be standardized.
Current law requires unmarried fathers to comply with fifty sets
of rules in order to protect their rights in all fifty states.
Legislatures could both protect paternal rights and increase
judicial efficiency by enacting a standard set of rules governing
termination of paternal rights. While passage of a national law
might be the most effective means of achieving this goal,
legislating family law matters has typically been the province of
the states. Since states should be free to craft their own laws, the
goal should be uniformity among the states, rather than a federal
paternal rights bill.
State laws should include several facets.184 They should
provide protection for unmarried fathers against fraud by birth
mothers, as in the Manzanares’ case. Such protections might
include crediting out-of-state fathers for complying with the
relevant laws in their home states. State laws should also
provide—and many already do provide—actual notice
requirements, ensuring that an unmarried father knows his child
may be adopted.185 In addition, in newborn adoption cases, states
should allow a reasonable response period after the child’s birth
during which an unaware father may assert his rights.

B. Education
Some have lobbied for implementation of a national putative
father registry.186 While this would eliminate the interstate
184. Some states have already enacted laws providing these protections. See, e.g.,
supra note 175.
185. Id.
186. See generally Beck, supra note 142; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121.5
(West 2017) (creating a “Compact for Interstate Sharing of Putative Father Registry
Information”).
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adoption problem, it would still be subject to the other
weaknesses posed by the existing registry system. In addition,
Congress has traditionally left family law matters to the states,
and deviating from this tradition would likely cause an uproar.
In order to eliminate the glaring lack-of-notice problem
posed by putative father registries, states—or the federal
government—should institute an informational campaign
designed to raise awareness about the registries. This could take
the form of anything from television advertisements to billboards
to awareness marches, but might be most effective long-term if
implemented as part of public school sexual education classes.
This proposal would certainly require both financial and
human resources, which are often in short supply in the
governmental realm. However, it would also provide education
to those who do not have the knowledge or time to self-educate
about their rights, and who are often unable to seek legal advice.
Such education would likely lead to a greater number of putative
fathers complying with the necessary requirements for
establishing their rights, thus promoting judicial efficiency by
reducing the number of cases requiring a judicial determination
of whether the father adequately protected his rights.

VI. CONCLUSION
The current state of the paternal rights of unmarried fathers
in the United States leaves much to be desired. Low-income
fathers, disproportionately men of color, bear the brunt of this
suboptimal state of affairs. While many states have procedures
for establishing paternity, low-income fathers are unlikely to
know of these procedures. Because of this, they are more likely
than their middle- and upper-class counterparts to have their
parental rights involuntarily terminated. In addition, these
fathers’ economic and marital status may give rise to unconscious
prejudice against them when judges apply the subjective aspects
of the biology plus test.
These issues are symptomatic of broader social issues—
most notably the vestiges of institutionalized racism, and societal
prejudice against nontraditional families. Only an understanding
of how the test disadvantages the vulnerable individuals it should
protect can produce a test better calculated to address the issues
at hand.
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